In my primary research in feminist ethics, I analyze how unjust conditions structure our ethical and interpersonal practices. For instance, I argue that oppressive norms are embedded in practices like blaming, excusing, interpersonal conflict resolution, and emotion regulation, and develop ethical guidance to help correct these norms. I am especially interested in identifying the emotional or affective harms of structural injustice as they bear on these practices. I have publications in Hypatia, Ergo, and Social Philosophy Today on these topics. For instance, in my paper, "Better Together: Expanding Intersubjective Agency as Resistance," recently published in Hypatia, I argue for a strategy of resisting oppression that attends to the realities of internalized oppression and the difficulties it can pose for effective resistance. Additionally, I have research interests in philosophical pedagogy concerning how some philosophical methods can exacerbate the marginalization of vulnerable groups, and in philosophy of psychiatry where I argue that treatment narratives can be weaponized against mentally ill people.

I have five articles in development in feminist ethics. First, in the paper "Untethered Blame," I argue that women experience disproportionate pressure to excuse wrongdoers that have hurt them, particularly for abusive harms. Traditional discussions of blame and excuse hold that when a victim excuses a wrongdoer, it is inappropriate to continue to blame or feel anger towards them. However, I argue that those who succumb to the pressure to excuse their abusers can nonetheless appropriately feel blame, anger, and hurt towards them. This type of "untethered" blame has not been recognized in the literature yet is phenomenologically relevant for some victims of abuse. I am currently revising this paper to send out to journals.

In a second paper, "Whatever You Want: The Affective Injustice of People-Pleasing," I offer a feminist analysis of people-pleasing, or behavior that aims to placate others by catering to their needs and emotions at the expense of one's own. People-pleasing has been misinterpreted as a laudable example of selflessness or else diagnosed as a problem of individual psychology. I instead offer a feminist analysis that evaluates people pleasing behavior as part of the gendered system of affective labor and overlaps with, yet is distinct from, the demands of care that women disproportionately bear. On my view, people-pleasing behavior is best understood as a form of relational threat mitigation learned in response to misogynistic hostilities; because it can alienate the pleaser from her own emotions, it is also a form of emotional injustice. I have presented this paper at two conferences and am editing the second draft.

A third paper will identify one way that relationship norms embed oppressive dynamics by analyzing two pieces of standard relationship advice, often directed at women in heterosexual romantic relationships: to "pick your battles" and not to expect your partner to be a "mind-reader." While on the surface both pieces of advice are reasonable, in a heteropatriarchal society this advice reinforces oppressive gender dynamics. The advice to "pick your battles" encourages women to swallow their anger and diminish the importance of their complaints under the guise of "letting it go," while the advice not to treat one's partner as a "mind-reader" reinforces the myth of women's inscrutability and lets men off the hook for doing the basic interpersonal labor that women routinely practice. I am developing this argument into a blog post for the Women in Philosophy blog of the APA and plan to expand it into an article-length paper.

In a fourth paper, I will motivate a novel form of affective injustice that I call emotionally dominating the space. Research in affective injustice has identified how oppressed individuals become "receptacles" for racists and sexist anger. I identify another, more subtle way that these individuals are unjustly saddled with others' negative emotions. This occurs in shared spaces when a person with privilege expresses ambient negative affect (e.g. annoyance or rancor that is not directed at anyone in the space) and that shapes the affective climate of the space. Emotional domination becomes an injustice when it reinforces an affective asymmetry: those with privilege are allowed to express negative emotions freely, regardless of the distress it may cause others, while those with less power—who are already tasked with managing and internalizing others' emotions and disallowed from free emotional expression—are forced to take on this negative ambient affect and perform the labor of intrinsic and extrinsic emotion regulation in response. I am drafting this paper and plan to submit it for conference presentation by the end of 2025.

A fifth paper will offer corrective action guidance to the affective asymmetries described above by arguing that passive aggression may help disrupt some oppressive norms in interpersonal relationships. Feminists have contested the value of civility by showing how norms of agreeableness can entrench oppressive dynamics, namely, by policing those with less power. Extending this line of reasoning, I will argue that when there are limited material, political, or psychological avenues available to respond to interpersonal expressions of oppressive norms, passive aggression—the indirect expression of discontent or disagreement that inconveniences its target—can offer a way for marginalized people to express negative emotions towards those with more power. This approach may also help combat some effects of emotional injustice as it provides for the (indirect) expression of "swallowed" emotions like anger and rancor. I am drafting this paper and plan to submit it for conference presentation in Spring 2026.

In addition to feminist ethics, I am also interested in philosophical pedagogy. The method of philosophy is presented as a neutral, objective enterprise of rationality: students are taught to evaluate all sides of a given argument regardless of their personal beliefs, and educators are expected to withhold their own moral and political commitments when teaching the material. While there is value in this approach, I argue that it can also be harmful. An ostensibly neutral evaluation of topics that concern marginalized lives (e.g. the ethics of abortion, gender oppression) can end up discounting lived experiences and legitimating hateful views, thus reinforcing that marginalization. To combat this harm, I argue that philosophy as a discipline and its educators should commit to an anti-oppressive stance instead of a value-neutral one. I am currently developing this argument into a presentation for the Teaching Hub of the Eastern APA in 2026. This paper will extend my existing work in philosophical pedagogy, including the publication "Reframing Abortion Lessons," published in Teaching Ethics, in which I argue that lessons on the ethics of abortion ought to be framed by the socio-political context of the issue.

A third strand of my research is in philosophy of psychiatry, especially as it intersects with philosophy of disability. Since the pandemic, more attention is given to the realities of mental illness and the values of therapy and self-care. But this attention has also come with misuse. I argue that narratives of treatment can be weaponized against mentally ill people. Unusual or unwanted behavior that is met with invectives to "get therapy" or "go back on your meds" reinforces an ableist equation of "bad" behavior (which is often code for subversive behavior) with mental illness and negligent care. I show how such discourse harms mentally ill people even when not directed towards them. This paper will build on my recent publication in philosophy of psychiatry, "Becoming Yourself: Existential Authenticity and Mental Illness," published in Existential Philosophy and Disability: Perspectives by Brill. In that chapter, I argue that mental illness can be compatible with authenticity—for some, symptoms of mental illness are an important part of who they are—and motivate this view using Simone de Beauvoir's existentialism.